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The European Union’s reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic – a preliminary 
assessment 
How well has the European Union handled the Covid-19 pandemic? Dionyssis G. 
Dimitrakopoulos and Georgette Lalis present a detailed analysis of the EU’s 
actions thus far in the outbreak. They write that despite a slow and initially 
haphazard approach, there has ultimately been a substantial response. 
Public health care systems, alongside state bureaucracies and public finances, are 
being tested to their limits by the Covid-19 pandemic. The same can be said – albeit 
in a different way – about the European Union. Indeed, since the problem at hand 
knows no borders, appealing to an organisation that operates at the ‘supranational’ 
level is not an unreasonable reaction to a crisis such as this and an existential threat 
like this pandemic. So, how has the EU fared thus far in this process?  
In what can only be a preliminary assessment, we argue that despite not having the 
legal powers to deal with the core element of this crisis (which started as a health 
issue first and foremost), the EU has done much more than meets the eye after what 
can be perceived (albeit not fairly – see below) as a slow start that has been marked 
by Christine Lagarde’s monumental blunder of 12 March that exacerbated Italy’s 
financial problems and reportedly forced her to apologise to the European Central 
Bank’s Governing Council. Nevertheless, the jury is still out because the 
implementation of these measures will necessarily take time. Also, many of them (in 
the economic sphere) may amount to nothing short of a paradigm shift and 
opposition will not give up that easily (see below). 
A matter of legal competence alone? Yes and no 
The treaty 
Any such assessment – if it is to be fair – must start from the issue of legal 
competence to act in such matters. In relation to the pandemic’s pure public health 
basis, it is important to note that there is no common EU health policy in place 
because organising and delivering public health care is the purview of national 
governments. Indeed, until 1992 and the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 129) the EU treaty 
did not even contain a direct reference to public health.  
Post-Lisbon, the treaty stipulates that while the Union’s action will merely 
complement national policies, it will cover (inter alia) ‘the fight against the major 
health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, their transmission and 
their prevention, as well as health information and education, and monitoring, early 
warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health’. Nevertheless, 
various other legal provisions have been used to regulate health-related issues 
ranging from standards for medical professions to pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 
human blood, health and safety at the workplace, anti-cancer/tobacco measures and 
last but not least free movement of patients and the famous European Health 
Insurance Card. 
The agencies 
The European Medicines Agency seeks to facilitate the development of and access 
to medicines, evaluates applications for marketing authorisation, contributes to 
monitoring the safety of medicines across their lifecycle and disseminates 
information to patients and professionals. The European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) is the EU agency that – since its establishment in 
2004 – collaborates with national health authorities across Europe so as to ‘identify, 
assess and communicate current and emerging threats to human health posed by 
infectious diseases’ by means of the collection, assessment and dissemination of 
data, the provision of scientific opinions and technical assistance (including training) 
and fostering the exchange of information and best practices.  
In case of a pandemic, the Early Warning and Response System links the European 
Commission, the ECDC and the European Economic Area’s national public health 
authorities that are in charge of countering serious cross-border threats to health, 
and it is used ‘for notifications on outbreaks, exchanging information and decisions 
about the coordination of measures among Member States’, including in cases such 
as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Ebola virus disease, avian influenza 
in humans and other communicable diseases.  
Although the European Commission has established the procedure whereby alerts 
(and corresponding measures) are notified via this system in relation to serious 
cross-border threats to health, ultimately member states are in charge of making and 
implementing the decisions. Earlier this month, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson 
reportedly vetoed the Department of Health’s request to retain post-Brexit access to 
this system. Finally, EU member states and the European Commission seek to co-
ordinate their views on issues under discussion by the World Health Organization. 
There are other, at least equally significant, ways in which the EU affects public 
health policy in case of a pandemic at the national level. After all, it started off as a 
public health crisis but is quickly morphing into a major economic and social crisis 
too. Three out of the four single market freedoms, namely the free movement of 
persons, services and goods can be affected by the pandemic, including export bans 
on sensitive public health products, import controls, the movement of health 
professionals, closing of frontiers and prohibition of citizens’ movement around 
Europe. 
With industrial production and consumption coming to a halt, and workers being 
forced to stay at home, action is required on the economic and monetary policy 
fronts, including for the members of the Euro Area that must comply with very tight 
limits on public spending and borrowing. Nevertheless, these countries differ in terms 
of financial wealth and the capacity of their national health care systems.  
So, what form has the EU’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic taken thus far? 
Does the impression match reality? 
An initially haphazard but ultimately substantial response  
A slow start in relation to public health? 
The bulk of this response begun unfolding in March although the ECDC had noted 
as early as on 9 January reports of 59 pneumonia cases ‘possibly associated with a 
novel coronavirus’ in Wuhan, China that has direct flight links to London, Paris and 
Rome and pointed that ‘[c]onsidering there is no indication of human-to-human 
transmission and no cases detected outside of China, the likelihood of introduction to 
the EU is considered to be low, but cannot be excluded. However, more 
epidemiological and laboratory information is needed in order to elaborate a 
comprehensive assessment of this event and the possible risk for the international 
spread.’  
The ECDC provided further updates on 14 January and 25 January, in the latter 
case noting a) the first reported (and not unexpected) cases within the EU (all with a 
direct link to Wuhan), b) ‘the fact that these cases were identified, proves that 
detection and confirmation of this novel virus is working in France, showing a high 
level of preparedness to prevent and control possible infections of 2019-nCoV’, c) 
the fact that ‘[m]ost EU countries have plans and measures in place to contain this 
kind of infection and Europe has well-equipped laboratories that can confirm 
probable cases in addition to hospitals that are prepared to treat patients 
accordingly’ and d) urged EU/EEA countries to ‘ensure that timely and rigorous 
infection prevention and control measures (IPC) are applied around people 
diagnosed with 2019-nCoV’.  
The ECDC also warned that ‘it is likely that there will be more imported cases in 
Europe. Even if there are still many things unknown about 2019-nCoV, European 
countries have the necessary capacities to prevent and control an outbreak as soon 
as cases are detected.’ Three days later, following a fourth case within the EU, the 
ECDC was noting that ‘[t]he source of infection is unknown and could still be active. 
Human-to-human transmission has been confirmed but more information is needed 
[…] As this is a rapidly evolving situation, ECDC is revising its risk assessment for 
Europe.’ It is unclear whether or the extent to which this reaction was due to 
inadequate information and the alleged cover up by the Chinese authorities of 
aspects of the problem. 
A series of decisions (following frequent teleconferences of the ministers of health 
and the ministers of the interior of the 27 member states) were made without 
attracting the publicity that was rightly given to subsequent measures (see below). 
They included a statement (13 February, i.e. almost a month before the WHO 
declared a pandemic) of the 27 health ministers undertaking to seek to limit the 
damage caused by the virus by sharing information, resources and equipment within 
a broader cross-European strategy entailing ‘close and enhanced coordination 
between Member States to ensure effectiveness of all measures (including in 
relation to diagnosis and treatment), including, if necessary, measures regarding 
travel, while safeguarding the free movement within the EU’ as well as the adoption 
of a common approach seeking to limit the spread of the virus until a vaccine 
becomes available.  
This approach entails tests to all airline passengers entering the Union via all major 
airports, extensive lock-down measures, the publication of detailed information on 
national capabilities (such as stocks of ventilators, drips, intensive care beds and 
anti-viral drugs) and a decision ‘to oversee the re-allocation of equipment and the re-
distribution of healthcare professionals to member states in need’. On 2 March the 
Croatian presidency escalated the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) 
arrangements from information sharing mode to full activation mode so as to identify 
major gaps across sectors and elaborate concrete EU response measures. 
Industrial, trade and state aid measures 
Rhetoric as well as decisions that have highlighted the need for co-ordination cannot 
conceal a national reflex despite the cross-border nature of the pandemic. For 
example, the European Commission, in addition to seeking to promote a co-
ordinated approach, has had to react to the decision of individual member states to 
put in place restrictions to the export of ‘an increasing range of products, starting with 
Personal Protective Equipment and extending more recently to medicines […] [that] 
create bottlenecks to production of essential supplies by locking inputs in specific 
Member States […], ultimately […] reintroduce internal borders at a time where 
solidarity between Member States is the most needed and they put obstacles to the 
effective protection of the health and lives of all’.  
Restrictions such as these have subsequently been lifted or modified in accordance 
with the Commission’s observations but the image of individual states acting on their 
own remains very potent and is reflective of a broader trend (see below). The 
European Commission has acknowledged that the situation in Italy has been 
‘exacerbated by the fact that several Member States have adopted/are adopting 
national measures, such as export bans, which seriously disrupt the already strained 
supply chain. The Commission has therefore insisted that Member States refrain 
from adopting/implementing such untargeted national measures and requested that 
they cooperate for implementation of an effective EU-wide approach, based on 
solidarity among Member States.’ It is, however, worth noting that the treaty (Art. 36) 
allows some prohibitions or restrictions on trade if ‘justified on grounds of public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants’ etc. as long as these do not ‘constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.’ It is 
difficult to argue that arbitrary discrimination applies in this case. 
On 10 March the European Council decided to a) ask the Commission to analyse the 
needs in relation to the provision of medical equipment and to propose initiatives to 
prevent shortages (in response to which it successfully launched joint public 
procurement in relation to personal protective equipment), b) agreed to ensure that 
the internal market functions properly and any unjustified obstacles are avoided and 
c) declared that the Union and the member states ‘stand ready to make use of all 
instruments that are necessary’. On 19 March the European Commission decided to 
create the first ever strategic ‘rescEU’ stockpile of medical equipment (e.g. 
ventilators, personal protective equipment, lab supplies) so as to assist EU member 
states in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
The European Commission has also announced the adoption of rules enabling 
member states to support the economy by making full use of the flexibility foreseen 
under the EU’s current state aid regime through the provision of liquidity and 
supporting the continuity of economic activity during the pandemic. Specifically, the 
aforementioned new arrangement provides for a) direct grants, selective tax 
advantages and advance payments; b) state guarantees for company loans from 
banks; c) subsidised public loans to companies; d) safeguards for banks that 
channel state aid to the real economy and e) short-term export credit insurance. It 
has subsequently authorised several such measures from a broad range of member 
states. 
In addition, the European Commission has instigated the release of the European 
standards that apply to crucial medical devices and personal protective equipment 
(e.g. masks, gloves, gowns) thus facilitating the task of companies that are willing to 
swiftly start production and place products on the internal market more easily whilst 
also ensuring safety. Exceptionally, it has also authorised the placing on the market 
of non-EU marked medical equipment. 
Freedom of movement 
The national approach of several member states was particularly evident in this area. 
Restrictions placed on the movement of people between the member states of the 
Schengen area were announced individually although they do reflect a previous 
collective decision (see supra). By 24 March, one by one and acting individually, a 
total of 14 Schengen countries (in order of notification: Austria, Hungary, Czechia, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Finland and Belgium) had informed the Commission that they had reinstated 
border controls in response to the pandemic. These decisions affect in particular but 
not only crossborder workers. Acting in a more systemic manner, the Commission 
proposed temporary restrictions on non-essential travel from third countries into the 
EU, which the European Council endorsed politically via teleconference on 17 March 
and the member states are gradually putting into place. 
Financing the economy: a paradigm shift? 
Despite reported opposition from (among others in a small minority) the head of the 
German central bank who as recently as 28 February was reportedly saying that 
“This is a very complex monetary policy issue which, in my view, does not require 
acute monetary policy action”, the European Central Bank launched two 
programmes, namely: a) a new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme with an 
envelope of €750 billion until the end of the year, which has had a direct calming 
effect in bond markets; and b) extra net asset purchases of €120 billion announced 
on 12 March. The ECB has stated that it will do whatever it takes to fight the 
expected economic consequences of the pandemic alongside the necessary fiscal 
effort that is required both at the European and the national level. As Marcel 
Fratzscher points out, the PEPP programme ‘is much more potent than some have 
realised so far, and in many ways more potent than the OMT programme’, since it 
entails no conditionality, it is more flexible and the issue/issuer limit of 33 per cent 
does not apply to it. 
Predictably, the ECB’s decision has already come under attack by some usual 
suspects. Be that as it may, the logic of the ECB’s plan is to foster financing 
(including to SMEs and households) as well as – as its chief economist pointed out – 
to ensure that if necessary, targeted support can be provided (e.g. to Italy). By 
buying debt issued by governments and firms, it lowers interest rates and helps 
governments and firms borrow and invest, thus creating jobs and raising income. 
Assuming other elements of the ECB’s asset purchase programme remain in place, 
this amounts to more than 1 trillion euros worth of purchases this year and the 
monetisation of about five per cent of GDP in Covid-19 public debt issuance.  
Crucially, for an institution that cares about its reputation as much as it does about its 
effectiveness, the ECB’s decisions have been praised by a broad range of 
economists (see, for example, here, here, here, here and here) including in 
Germany, and have the support of French President Macron but prominent 
economists such as Paul de Grauwe, Karl Whelan, Thomas Philippon, and Luis 
Garicano argue further action will be required. For example, the US Senate and the 
Trump administration have reached agreement on a package worth 2 trillion dollars.  
In mid-March the ECB also announced action (in tandem with other central banks 
across the globe) in relation to currency swap lines so as to limit the risk of 
dislocation in the financial sector and a potential procyclical reduction of bank 
lending. The Commission has also instigated the ‘Coronavirus Response Investment 
Initiative’ whereby 37 billion euros will be directed from the EU’s cohesion budget to 
the fight against the coronavirus crisis and proposes to extend the scope of the EU 
Solidarity Fund by also including a public health crisis within its scope. 
However, the most path-breaking act is the European Commission’s proposal (that 
the finance ministers of the member states have endorsed) to activate the general 
escape clause that operates since 2011 under the Euro Area’s Stability and Growth 
Pact so as to enable ‘a coordinated and orderly temporary deviation from the normal 
requirements for all Member States in a situation of generalised crisis caused by a 
severe economic downturn either in Euro Area or the EU as a whole.’ In this way 
member states will have much more room to pursue fiscal policy measures 
commensurate with the scale of the crisis. 
It is worth noting that these economic measures have been adopted in addition to 
the national measures introduced by national governments, the most emblematic of 
which is the German government’s. There is no doubt that fiscal policy measures too 
are needed if the EU is to limit the damage done by the pandemic, as Isabel 
Schnabel too, pointedly noted. 
Further proposals abound. Hundreds of social scientists (including prominent figures 
such as Thomas Piketty and Mark Blyth) signed an open letter to the European 
Council (published in the FT) calling for Eurobonds. Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro 
Sanchez called for a ‘Marshall Plan’ also involving joint bonds. He is one of nine 
heads of state or governments who support common debt issuance.  As expected, 
Dutch PM Mark Rutte opposes them as does Chancellor Merkel. No wonder the 
teleconference of the European Council on 26 March ended in failure. Martin Sandbu 
proposed the use of ‘helicopter money’.  
Conclusion 
As is always the case, ‘Brussels’ is not hard to blame or criticise. On this occasion 
though, we argue that criticism must be confined to speed, rather than the 
substance. After a slow start, the EU has deployed its full panoply across a whole 
range of policy areas in an effort to counter the devastating consequences of this 
pandemic.  
As Guy Verhofstadt rightly noted, ‘Covid-19 showed how little it means to be 
European in times of crisis. It made one thing clear: the Eurosceptic mantra of the 
'European Superstate' becoming more ridiculous by the day. People see the 
European Directorate [sic] for Health and Food Safety and the European Medicine 
Agency and think: they have the tools and money, why don't they act? The answer 
is: because – just like Europol is not a real police force – these European health 
administrations do not have any real powers to act. They are largely – you get it – 
"coordinating" bodies; assembling information and data from all over Europe and 
sending it back and forth between member states; the most what they can do, is 
issuing recommendations. What is absolutely insufficient in times of pandemic. Then 
it is the 27 health ministers who take it over and are supposed to launch decisive 
collective action. Or more correctly – as we have seen – mainly fail to streamline 
their actions.’ 
The national tendencies of several member states were initially quite prominent. 
Nevertheless, as Commissioner Johansson reportedly noted, in this crisis EU 
member states acted like humans do – the first instinct being to fend for themselves, 
until they realised the value of cooperation. It remains to be seen whether the joint 
action that has followed will be effective but there are some lessons that the EU can 
already draw.  
First, those who – like Bill Gates – have been arguing that the West ought to pay 
much more attention to this kind of issue, clearly have a point. Second, some of the 
capability that the Chinese state possesses and has mobilised to counter the virus, is 
clearly unwelcome and not feasible in Europe. This does not mean that Europeans 
cannot be educated in combatting pandemics so that the next one finds us better 
prepared. Third, capability-wise, Europe should invest in new medicines (i.e. R&D), 
testing materials, and the security of supply of key equipment so that they are 
available when needed. This also means increasing the production of critical 
equipment within the EU.  
Fourth, the EU should strengthen its decision-making process in times of crisis to 
ensure efficiency, speed and visibility. The recent proposal made by the President of 
the European Council is a step in the right direction. Subsidiarity in normal times is 
fine in areas where competence is shared between levels of governance, but this 
pandemic is a cross-border issue that can be better handled at the European level 
with better co-ordinated and science-based decisions. If the ‘supranational’ centre 
remains weak or docile, those who stand to lose ultimately include EU citizens as 
well as the member states themselves. So, more confidence in the Commission’s 
capacity to coordinate would be welcome, as would more visibility in relation to its 
activity. 
Finally, it is high time austerity policies were reviewed now that everyone knows that 
it has undermined public health systems’ ability to combat pandemics.  
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